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I. A TANGLED TALE
When they feel the need to distinguish genuine science - the
real thing-from pretenders, or to understand what is distinctive
about the scientific method, U.S. courts have sometimes called on
Karl Popper's conception of falsifiability as the hallmark of the
genuinely scientific, and his account of the method of science as
conjecture and refutation. Sometimes the legal issue before the
courts is the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in applica-
tion to biology teaching in public high schools, and the question is
whether "creation science" is really science, or only religion in dis-
guise.' Much more often, though, the legal issue is one of evidence
* This paper is based on a (much shorter) presentation, first given at a conference
on "Objective Knowledge: Popper and Beyond," at the Max Weber Program, Euro-
pean University Institute, Fiesole, in March 2009. My thanks to Pamela Lucken for
research assistance, and to Mark Migotti and Stephen Urice for helpful comments on
draft versions.
t Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and
Sciences, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1 In McLean v. Arkansas, for example, the court reasoned that, unlike the theory of evolu-
tion, creation "science" is unfalsifiable, and so is not really science at all, but rather a reli-
gious doctrine; hence a statute mandating equal time for evolution and creation science in
public high-school biology classes was unconstitutional -in violation of the Establishment
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law, and the question is whether this or that scientific expert testi-
mony is reliable enough to be admissible. This will be my focus
here.
As anyone familiar with the legal history will know, this story
begins with the Supreme Court's first-ever decision on the admissi-
bility of expert testimony, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (1993).2 Ruling for a unanimous Court that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 (1975)3 had superseded the old Frye rule,4 but that courts
still had a responsibility to screen proffered expert testimony for
both relevance and reliability, Justice Blackmun went on (now
speaking only for the majority) to suggest that in determining
whether a theory or technique is "scientific knowledge that will as-
sist the trier of fact," ordinarily, "a key question to be answered will
be whether it can be (and has been) tested." And in this context, he
cites Popper.5
Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONSr. amend. I; McLean v.
Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Popper's philosophy of science was
invoked first by Michael Ruse as expert witness for the plaintiffs, and then (without Pop-
per's name) by Judge Overton in his ruling, to argue that the theory of evolution is sci-
ence, but "creation science" is not. Michal Ruse, Witness Testimony Sheet: McLean v. Ar-
kansas, in BUT Is IT ScIENcE? THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION
CONTROVERSY 287 (Michael Ruse ed., 1996).
2 509 U.S. 579.
3 At the time of Daubert, FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) read: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the finder of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." (In 2000 Rule 702 was modified to read: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or oth-
erwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.")
4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (affirming judgment ex-
cluding results of a then-new blood-pressure deception test, finding that, "while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to be generally accepted in the field to which it belongs" (emphasis
added)).
5 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (citing KARL R. POPPER, CONJECrURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (1967)). Falsifiability is the
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In an article published the following year, Professor Allen
commented that, with Daubert, the Supreme Court had "replaced a
judicial anachronism [Frye] with a philosophical one [Popper]." 6 It's
a nice one-liner, and there is an element of truth in it. For - while for
decades Popper was not only enormously influential in philosophy
of science (though, interestingly, less so in the United States than
elsewhere), but also much admired by some important scientists of
the day -by the time Daubert came down, the year before his death
at the age of ninety-three, he was no longer the major player he had
once been. The English edition of his Logic of Scientific Discovery first
appeared in 1959.7 Since that time, numerous rivals to his falsifica-
tionist approach had found supporters: Thomas Kuhn's picture of
routine, "normal" science conducted under a ruling paradigm, and
the overturning and replacement of an old paradigm by a new in
periods of "revolutionary" science (1962); 8 Imre Lakatos's post-
Kuhnian, quasi-Popperian attempt to distinguish progressive from
degenerating research programs (1965);9 Paul Feyerabend's meth-
odological anarchism (1975);10 and, more recently, the many and
various more or less radical styles of "science studies," and the
first of four indicia of reliability (now known as the "Daubert factors") suggested in
the ruling: whether the theory or technique at issue can be (and has been) tested; the
known or potential error-rate; whether the work has been subjected to peer review
and publication; and (in a nod to Frye) acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
6 Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1157, 1164 (1994) (quoting Christopher Kamper, Paradigms Talking Past Each Other:
Expert Testimony and Problems of Translation (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology)); id. at 1164 n.14. I note that
Frye is not quite the legal anachronism Professor Allen's observation suggests; it
remains the law in seventeen states (Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin). TERENCE J.
CAMPBELL & DEMOSTHENES LORANDOS, CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTS IN THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES §1:16.1 n.7 (2009).
7 KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (English ed., 1959) (1934).
8 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCIURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
9 Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in
4 CRMCISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COLLOQUIUM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, LONDON, 1965, at 91 (Imre Lakatos &
Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
10 PAUL K. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (rev. ed. 1978) (1975).
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Bayesian currents in philosophy of science." Popper still has his
devotedly loyal followers, though they are fewer than they once
were. But others dismiss him as a philosophical "sloganeer," 12 traf-
ficking in superficially appealing but ultimately disappointing phi-
losophical "soundbites";13 and the reviewer of a biography of Pop-
per writes in the New York Times Book Review that, because of his
notorious unwillingness to listen to anyone who dared to criticize
his views, Popper had "condemned himself to a lifetime in the ser-
vice of a bad idea."14
However, Professor Allen's comment may suggest that Justice
Blackmun was knowingly endorsing Popper's philosophy "whole
cloth" - which would be a serious over-simplification. For, in the
same sentence in which he cites Popper, Justice Blackmun hedged
his bets by also referring to another, far less radical philosopher of
" See, e.g., THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2009), http://plato.stanford.edu, in which no fewer than thirteen entries refer to
"Bayesianism"-the more relevant being James Joyce, Bayes' Theorem,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem; Thomas Kelly, Evidence,
http:plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence; Alan Hajek, Interpretations of Probability,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/; and James Hawthorne,
Inductive Logic, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/.
12 Noretta Koertge, Lecture at the Summer School for Theory of Knowledge, War-
saw Madralin: Popper and the Science Wars (Aug. 16-31 1997), available at
http://www.indiana.edu/-koertge/PopLectl.html. This Summer School was sup-
ported by the financier George Soros, a long-time admirer of Popper (and especially
of his political philosophy). Id. See also William Shawcross, Turning Dollars into
Change, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997, at 51("After leaving Soviet-controlled Hungary for Lon-
don in 1947, Soros fell under the spell of ... Karl Popper," whose philosophy in-
formed his banking practice, prompted his founding of the Open Society Institute,
and influenced "his whole life.").
13 Rebecca Goldstein, The Popperian Sound Bite, in WHAT HAVE YOU CHANGED
YOUR MIND ABOUT?: TODAY'S LEADING MINDS RETHINK EVERYTHING 8 (John
Brockman ed., 2009).
14 David Papineau, The Proof is in the Disproof, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, § 7, at 28
(reviewing MALACHI HAIM HACOHEN, KARL POPPER-THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1902-
1945: POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN INTERWAR VIENNA (2000)), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/12/books/the-proof-is-in-the-disproof.html.
Another reviewer of the same biography, also commenting on Popper's notoriously
difficult personality, conjectures that he adopted the manner and speech of a much
bigger man to compensate for being so short in stature. Ivor Grattan-Guinness,
Truths and Contradictions about Karl Popper, 59 ANNALS SCI. 89, 93 (2002).
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science, Carl Hempel;15 and this suggests that he was not fully
aware how radical Popper's philosophy of science really is.
In any case, "out of date" just doesn't cut it as a criticism of a
philosophical theory. The real difficulty with Daubert's appeal to
Popper is not, as Professor Allen's comment might suggest, that by
1993 Popper's ideas were going out of style, overshadowed by the
success of Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.16 No:
the most glaring problem-as anyone familiar with Popper's phi-
losophy of science would realize-is much more serious: it was
downright bizarre to call on Popper-Popper, of all people!-to
help determine whether expert scientific testimony is sufficiently
reliable to be admissible. For a key thesis of Popper's is that scientific
claims can never be shown to be true, probable, or reliable. A second
problem follows hard on the heels of the first: if Popper's account
were true, there would be no way to recognize reliable scientific
testimony, so that the Court's preoccupation with the reliability of
such testimony would rest on a serious misconception.
Some readers of this journal will, I suspect, be more familiar with
Popper as a political philosopher than as a philosopher of science. So
I will begin by presenting his philosophy of science in enough detail
to show that it can't possibly provide a criterion of the reliability of
scientific testimony (Part II). The next step will be to spell out how
Justice Blackmun misconstrues Popper's ideas, and to identify some
sources of this misunderstanding in the amicus briefs in Daubert and
in the then-recent legal literature, as well as in Popper himself (Part
III). Then it will be time to look at what federal courts have made of
the Supreme Court's allusions to Popper as Daubert has played out in
subsequent rulings on the admissibility of scientific testimony-
which will reveal that courts and legal scholars have continued to
misunderstand how radical Popper's ideas really are and, more im-
portantly, how unsuitable for their purposes (Part IV). This will con-
clude the deconstruction of which my title speaks.
But, as my title also signals, my ultimate purpose is reconstruc-
tion: I hope, that is, to make some positive headway on legal issues
15 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (citing CARL G.
HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)).
16 In fact, by 1993 Kuhn was no longer so dominant a figure as he had once been,
either.
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about scientific testimony. So my concluding argument will be, first,
that the justice system's concern with reliability is both legally es-
sential and philosophically legitimate; and second that, ironically
enough-though the philosophy of science to which Daubert ap-
peals is less than no help in determining reliability - the misinter-
pretation many federal courts have given the first, quasi-Popperian
Daubert factor is closer to the truth than the Popperian philosophy
of science from which it ostensibly derives (Part V).
II. WILL THE REAL KARL POPPER PLEASE STAND UP?
Popper's work poses considerable difficulties for an expositor,
not least because-to adapt a turn of phrase from J. L. Austin-
there are the parts where Popper says it, and then there are the
parts where he takes it back.17 So, besides what I take to be the au-
thentic, tough-minded falsificationist Popper, there is also a kind of
shadow Popper: a more moderate and more plausible Popper, per-
haps, but a more moderate and more plausible Popper who offers
not so much a fully articulated philosophy of science as a congeries
of plausible fallibilist apergus and a couple of very appealing meta-
phors which, however, are neither easily reconciled with the main
thrust of his arguments nor easily put together to form a better al-
ternative picture. I'll get to this shadow Popper later; but let me be-
gin with what I take to be the core themes of Popper's official ac-
count.
His Big Idea came to him, Popper tells us, around 1919 (when, I
note, he would have been seventeen years old).' 8 Many years later,
he explained that it was disenchantment with the Marxist "scientific
socialism" with which he had been enamored at sixteen that first
made him aware how crucial the difference is between dogmatic
1 J.L. AUSTIN, Performative Utterances, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233, 241 (JO. Urm-
son & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979) (1956) (asking "now we feel the firm ground of
prejudice glide away beneath our feet ... what next?" and replying, "[y]ou will be
waiting for ... the bit where we take it all back"); J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 2
(G.J. Warnock ed.,1962) (noting that philosophers who profess to believe that the
objects of perception are not physical objects but sense data sometimes say that really
this is just what we believed all along: "[tlhere's the bit where you say it and the bit
where you take it back").
18
KARL POPPER, UNENDED QUEST: AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY 31-38 (rev.
ed. 1976) (1974).
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thinking (bad) and a critical attitude (good).19 This awareness, he
continues, was reinforced by his encounters with Freud's and
Adler's psycho-analytic theories, and emphatically underscored
when Einstein's eclipse predictions were "successfully tested." 20
The specific shape that Popper's Big Idea took is best under-
stood in terms of his reaction to the approach taken by the Logical
Positivists of the Vienna Circle,21 the main thrust of which was to
draw the line between good, clean scientific work and meaningless
metaphysical speculation. The Logical Positivists proposed verifi-
ability as the criterion of demarcation of meaningful from meaningless
statements, and envisaged scientific theories' being confirmed in-
ductively: i.e., as being warranted by evidence which, though not
absolutely conclusive, makes it likely that the theory is true.22 But
Popper came to see the asymmetry between verification and falsifi-
cation as crucial: positive instances, no matter how many, cannot
show that an unrestricted universal claim is true, whereas a single
counter-instance is enough to show that it is false. Moreover, he
argued, induction is neither necessary nor justifiable: scientists do
not arrive at hypotheses by inductive reasoning from particular in-
stances, nor are hypotheses ever inductively supported by positive
evidence.
So Popper turned Logical Positivism on its head.2 In The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (first published, in German, in 1934), he proposed
19 Id. at 38.
20 Id. at 37-38. The ambiguity of the phrase "successfully tested" is worthy of note.
Popper is not entitled to any meaning stronger than "the tests were conducted ac-
cording to plan and Einstein's account was not falsified." However, what the phrase
inevitably suggests is that the tests were conducted, Einstein's predictions con-
firmed, and his account shown to be successful.
21 Popper was not a member of the Circle, but presented papers at what Professor
Singer describes as "epicycles" of the group. Peter Singer, Discovering Karl Popper,
N.Y. REV. BooKs, May 2, 1974 at 22, 22 (book review), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/9523.
22 See, e.g., A.J. AYER, ED., LOGICAL PosmvisM (1959) (including classic papers by
various Logical Positivists, and an introductory history of the movement).
23 David Stove -probably Popper's severest critic, and certainly the funniest -
observes that "the idea of reversal ... is also the key to Popper's philosophy of sci-
ence," and that "[a] Freudian might see, or imagine he sees, something more than
adolescent revolt, something actually obsessive, in Popper's compulsion to reverse
things." David Stove, Cole Porter and Karl Popper: The Jazz Age in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, in AGAINST THE IDOLS OF THE AGE 3,5,7 (Roger Kimball ed., 1999).
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falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from non-science
and a purely deductive account of scientific method.24 The core ideas
of this - as one might call it - Logical Negativist 25 position are, in
brief:
* Falsifiability is a criterion for demarcating science, the real
thing, both from pseudo-sciences, such as "scientific social-
ism" and psychoanalysis, and from history, metaphysics,
mythology, religion, "pre-science," etc.26
* A statement is falsifiable, and hence scientific, only if it is
incompatible with some basic statement,27 i.e., a statement
reporting the occurrence of an observable event at a speci-
fied place and time.28
* A statement is falsified when a basic statement with which
it is incompatible is accepted. 29
* The acceptance of basic statements is a matter for decision
on the part of the relevant scientific community. What a sci-
entist observes may motivate a scientist to accept a basic
statement, but no observation can ever constitute evidence
justifying or warranting the acceptance of such a statement.3 0
24 POPPER, supra note 7, at 40-41.
z This label, though very apt, is not very common; Popper's position is more often
called "Critical Rationalism," "falsificationism," or "deductivism." (If I recall cor-
rectly, I learned the phrase "Logical Negativism" from my former colleague David
Miller.)
26 POPPER, supra note 7, at 40 (" [T]he falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a cri-
terion of demarcation."). In UNENDED QUEST, Popper tells us that the criterion of
demarcation was originally intended to exclude Marxism and psychoanalysis, and
only later extended to exclude metaphysics. POPPER, supra note 18, at 41.
27 POPPER, supra note 7, at 86 (explaining that a theory is falsifiable if "it divides the
class of all possible basic statements . . . into ... those basic statements with which it
is inconsistent ... [and] the class of those basic statements which it does not contra-
dict"). In other words, as Popper also puts it, "the class of its potential falsifiers is not
empty." Id.
28 Id. at 102-03. "Basic statements are ... statements asserting that an observable
event is occurring in a certain individual region of space and time." Id. at 103.
29 Id. at 86 ("We say that a theory is falsified only if we have accepted basic state-
ments which contradict it."). Popper goes on to add that "[w]e shall take [a claim] as
falsified only if we discover a reproducible effect which refutes the theory." Id. Note
that this addendum runs together basic statements and the events they describe.
3 Id. at 105 ("Experiences can motivate a decision, and hence an acceptance or rejec-
tion of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them -no more than
402 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 5:394
* The only logical relations are deductive. There is no induc-
tive logic, nor does science use induction.3'
* Science proceeds by "conjecture and refutation": a scientist
makes an informed guess about the explanation of some
puzzling phenomenon, deduces consequences of this guess,
and - this is the distinctively Popperian methodological
point - tries to refute it by subjecting those consequences to
the severest possible tests.32
* This method uses only deductive logic-most importantly,
the deductive rule of modus tollens, which licenses the infer-
ence from "if p then q" and "not q" to "not p," used in the
refutation phase.33
* Scientists should make bold, highly falsifiable conjectures;
test them as severely as possible; and, should they be falsi-
fied when they are tested, drop them and start again rather
than making ad hoc adjustments to save them.M This will-
ingness to accept falsification is another criterion of the
genuinely scientific.35
by thumping the table."). The argument seems to be twofold. First, justification is a
logical relation, and logical relations can hold only among statements; so, since ob-
servations are not statements but events, they cannot stand in any kind of logical
relation to a statement. Second, even a basic statement like "here is a glass of water"
is imbued with theory. So the content of basic statements goes beyond what can be
determined by observation; and if observations could stand in logical relations to
basic statement, the relation would have to be an inductive (or, better, an ampliative)
one - but there are no such relations. (This involves some rational reconstruction of
Popper's text, disentangling two strands of argument that he runs together. See
SusAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY 144-49 (2d ed., 2009) (1993)).
31 POPPER, supra note 7, at 29-30 (arguing that "the various difficulties of inductive
logic ... are insurmountable. . . . The theory to be developed in the following pages
stands directly opposed to all attempts to operate with the idea of inductive logic").
32 Id. at 32-33; see also POPPER, supra note 7, at 51 (" fTMhere is no more rational proce-
dure than the method of trial and error-of conjecture and refutation: of boldly proposing
theories; of trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them
tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful.").
33 POPPER, supra note 7, at 76 ("The falsifying mode of inference ... is the modus tol-
lens of classical logic.").
Id. at 82 (urging that we should decide that "in the case of a threat to our system,
we will not save it by any kind of conventionalist stratagem.").
3Id. (explaining that "my criterion of demarcation cannot be applied immediately
to a system of statements," but that "[oinly with reference to the method applied ... is it at
Federal Philosophy of Science
* The probability of a claim is inversely related to its content;
i.e., the more a statement says -and hence, the more falsifi-
able it is - the more improbable it is.36
* Theories which have been tested but not (yet) falsified have
been - in a technical sense explained below - "corrobo-
rated," to a degree depending on the severity of the tests
passed.37
* To say that a theory is corroborated is to say that it has been
subjected to such-and-such tests, and has not, so far, been
falsified. This is strictly a report on the past. That a theory
has been corroborated, to however high a degree, doesn't
show that it is true, that it is probable, that there is reason to
believe it -or that it is reliable.
On this last point-which in the present context is obviously cru-
cial-Popper is unambiguously clear: "Corroboration (or degree of
corroboration) is . . . an evaluating report of past performance.. . . [Ilt
says nothing whatever about future performance, or about the 'reliability'
of a theory."38 Again: "I lay stress on negative arguments, such as
negative instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted
refutations-in short, criticism-while the inductivist lays stress on
'positive instances' from which he draws 'non-demonstrative infer-
ences' and which he hopes will guarantee the 'reliability' of those
inferences."3 9
In short, the core Popperian philosophy -which eschews verifi-
ability, inductive logic, confirmation, supportive evidence, and reli-
ability, and which urges scientists to make bold, highly falsifiable,
and hence improbable, conjectures-is thoroughly negative. In fact,
it's far more negative than Popper acknowledges. Presenting himself
all possible to ask whether we are dealing with a conventionalist or an empirical
theory").
36 Id. at 269; see also KARL R. POPPER, Conjectural Knowledge, in OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 1, 18 (1972) (arguing that the degree of
testability of a theory is inversely related to its probability).
37 POPPER, supra note 7, at 265-69. The English translation of the heading of this sec-
tion of the book speaks of "How a Hypothesis May 'Prove its Mettle."' However, in
footnote *1 on pages 53 and 251 of the English edition, Popper acknowledges that
this phrase is potentially misleading.
38 POPPER, Conjectural Knowledge, in OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 36, at 18.
39 Id. at 20.
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as a champion of science, Popper purports to provide a thoroughly
fallibilist, but still fully cognitivist, picture. But what he actually gives
us is a kind of covert skepticism."0 Indeed, his account is even more
negative than we have seen thus far. For if, as Popper maintains, in-
duction is wholly unjustifiable, there can be no reason to believe that
a theory that passed a certain test today would pass the same test
tomorrow. Moreover, if, as he maintains, the acceptance of basic
statements is not justified by scientists' observations but is a matter of
decisions on the part of the scientific community, there is no guaran-
tee that a scientific statement that has been "falsified" is actually false;
and this implies that scientific claims can no more be shown to be
false than they can be shown to be true.
Still, as Kierkegaard observes, " [i]n relation to their systems
most systematizers are like a man who builds an enormous castle
and lives in a shack nearby."4' Popper is no exception. When he
finds his forbidding Logical Negativist castle uninhabitable, he
takes refuge in humbler but more comfortably fallibilist quarters.
And this shadow Popper qualifies, amends, amplifies, and restates
his Logical Negativism in ways that obfuscate matters considerably.
Numerous qualifications obscure both the character and the moti-
vation of the Logical Negativist criterion of demarcation. Appealing
analogies purportedly illustrating Logical Negativism suggest,
rather, a much more modest fallibilism. New ideas are added that
seem, superficially, to moderate Logical Negativism, but on closer
inspection turn out to leave it untouched. And, all along, Popper
continues to use familiar, reassuring words while, all along, strip-
ping them of essential meaning.
Despite his stress on the importance of distinguishing genuine sci-
ence from impostors -and his claim to have discovered what is wrong
4 "Skepticism" is used here in the philosophical sense in which it refers to the the-
sis that we can know nothing, not in the ordinary-language usage in which it means
"taking a critical, questioning attitude."
4 SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE JOURNALS OF SOREN KIERKEGAARD 156 (Alexander
Dru ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1938) (1846).
404
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with Marxism, Freudian psychoanalytic theory, etc.42-in the introduc-
tion to the English edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper
tells us that scientific knowledge is continuous with everyday empiri-
cal knowledge;43 and in the body of the book, he describes his criterion
of demarcation as a convention44- leaving one wondering what, ex-
actly, the motivation is for wanting a criterion of demarcation in the
first place. Then, in section 9, he acknowledges that the deduction of
basic statements from a scientific theory will require auxiliary assump-
tions, and that by modifying these, we could shield a theory from falsi-
fication by contrary evidence.45 So his criterion of demarcation is not,
after all, purely logical, but partly methodological; and his methodo-
logical advice is not, after all, categorical ("drop a theory when it is fal-
sified"), but conditional ("drop a theory if you can't find a non-ad-hoc
way of sidestepping contrary evidence"). 46 By now one is left wonder-
ing what, exactly, the criterion amounts to; what, exactly, it excludes" 7
42 See, e.g., POPPER, Science: Conjectures and Refutations, in CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS, supra note 5, at 34 (recalling that his initial question, when it all began
in 1919, was "[wihat is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psy-
chology?"); POPPER, UNENDED QUEST, supra note 18, at 38 (recalling that by the end
of that year he had arrived at the conclusion that "the scientific attitude ... did not
look for verifications but for crucial tests; tests which could refute the theory tested,
though they could never establish it").
4 POPPER, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining that "scientific knowledge can only be an
extension of common-sense knowledge").
4 Id. at 37 ("My criterion of demarcation will ... have to be regarded as a . . . con-
vention.").
45 Id. at 49-50.
46 Id. at 82 (suggesting that it is willingness to accept falsification, rather than sim-
ply falsifiability, that makes a theory scientific). But in Conjectural Knowledge, supra
note 36, Popper returns in a footnote to the old, logical understanding: "The 'prob-
lem of demarcation' is what I call the problem of finding a criterion by which we can
distinguish the statements of empirical science from non-empirical statements." Id. at
12 n.19.
4" At one time, Popper himself suggested that the theory of evolution is not a scien-
tific theory, but a "metaphysical research programme." POPPER, supra note 18, at 167.
He later changed his mind: the theory of natural selection is testable, and so it is sci-
ence, after all. Karl R. Popper, Natural Selection and Its Scientific Status, in POPPER
SELECTIONS 239-246 (David Miller ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1977). Ruse's
testimony in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark.
1982), mentioned none of this, though a book he published the year before reveals
that he was well aware of it. MICHAEL RUSE, DARWINISM DEFENDED: A GUIDE TO THE
EVOLUTION CONTROVERSIES 132-33 (1982) (acknowledging that at one time Popper
had denied that the theory of evolution is a scientific theory).
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and what, exactly, it is intended to demarcate from what. Does it apply
to theories? And if so, is it intended to demarcate the scientific from the
non-scientific, or the empirical from the non-empirical? Or is it in-
tended, rather, to demarcate scientific from non-scientific procedures -
or what?
In The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), Popper tells us that
the problem with Marxist scientific socialism was not, after all, that
it was unfalsifiable, but that after it was falsified by the events of the
Russian revolution, Marxists evaded this refutation by reinterpret-
ing the theory. 8 But by the time of "Conjectural Knowledge" (1971),
recognizing that modifying a theory in the face of contrary evidence
isn't always bad practice, Popper acknowledges "the value of a dog-
matic attitude," writing that "somebody [has] to defend a theory
against criticism or it would succumb too easily." 49 One is left un-
sure whether Popper is really offering a stringent methodological
regimen, or only the tritest of methodological bromides.
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery,50 and again in Conjectures and
Refutations,51 Popper describes the relation of science to its "empiri-
cal basis" as like piles driven into a swamp-a nice analogy 52
which, however, suggests a plausible fallibilist picture of basic
statements as partially but not fully justified by scientists' observa-
tions. But this picture can't possibly be squared with Popper's insis-
tence that observation is irrelevant to justification. And in an article
published in 1968, Popper describes scientific work as like building
48 KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 374 (rev. ed., 1950) (1945)
("Experience shows that Marx's prophecies were false. But experience can always be
explained away. And, indeed, Marx himself, and Engels, began the elaboration of an
auxiliary hypothesis to [evade falsification]."); see also POPPER, supra note 18, at 43.
4 POPPER, supra note 36, at 30.
5 POPPER, supra note 7, at 111.
5' POPPER, supra note 5, at 377. See also A.J. Ayer, Truth, Verification and Verisimili-
tude, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER 684, 684 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1974),
and Popper's reply, Ayer on Empiricism and Against Verisimilitude, id. at 1100; A.M.
Quinton, The Foundations of Knowledge, in BRITISH ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 55 (Ber-
nard Williams & Alan Montefiore eds., 1966).
52 A nice analogy anticipated more than fifty years earlier by C.S. Peirce. CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism (1898), in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE para. 589 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934)
("[Our knowledge] is not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a
bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present.") (references to the
COLLECTED PAPERS are by volume and paragraph number).
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a cathedral5 3 -a really splendid analogy which, however, suggests a
more or less cumulative picture of scientific progress. But this pic-
ture can't possibly be squared with the falsificationist conception,
according to which science would be more like a Kafkaesque build-
ing site where, each day, workers try to demolish the previous
day's work and, when they succeed, begin building anew - until
the next day.M One is left with the distinct impression that Popper
wants to have it both ways: that he is anxious to claim credit for a
big, radical idea, but unwilling to swallow its big, radical conse-
quences.
In a note appended to the English edition of The Logic of Scien-
tific Discovery, Popper tells us that after he encountered Alfred Tar-
ski's theory of truth55 - which he, unlike Tarski himself, saw as a
version of the correspondence theory5 6 -he overcame his earlier
reluctance to speak of the truth of scientific theories.57 In due course
he developed his account of "verisimilitude," or as he also says,
53 POPPER, On the Theory of the Objective Mind, in OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note
38, 153, 185 ("Science ... is a branch of literature; and working on science is a human
activity like building a cathedral").
5 Popper adds that "[tihe method of problem solving, the method of conjecture
and refutation, is practised by both [science and the humanities]." He goes on to
compare constructing a theory of radioactivity and reconstructing a damaged text.
Id. But once the method of conjecture and refutation has been elided into generic
"problem-solving," and applied to the humanities and even to literature, it is not
clear what reason remains for worrying about demarcation.
55 ALFRED TARSKI, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, LOGIC, SEMANTICS,
METAMATHEMATICS 152 (John Corcoran ed., J.H. Woodger trans., 2nd ed. 1983)
(1956); Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,
in READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 52,53 (Herbert Feigl & Wilfrid Sellars eds.,
1944) [hereinafter TARSKI, Semantic Conception].
56 Compare Alfred Tarski, Semantic Conception, supra note 55, at 54 (claiming that
several accounts of truth, among them the correspondence theory, "can lead to vari-
ous misunderstandings," and that "none of them can be considered a satisfactory
definition") with POPPER, supra note 18, at 98 (reporting that in 1935, after Tarski
explained his theory of truth to him, he realized that "[Tarski] had finally rehabili-
tated the much maligned correspondence theory of truth").
57 POPPER, supra note 7, at 274 ("We need not say that the theory is 'false', but we
may say instead that it is contradicted by a certain set of accepted basic statements.
Nor need we say of basic statements that they are 'true' or 'false', for we may inter-
pret their acceptance as the result of a conventional decision . . . ." Note *1 added in
the English edition "Owing to Tarski's teaching, I am no longer hesitant in speaking
of 'truth' and 'falsity'.").
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"truth-likeness," or "nearness to the truth."5 But it turns out that
degree of corroboration is not (as one might have hoped) a measure
of degree of verisimilitude, but only of what the verisimilitude of a
theory appears to be, relative to other theories, at a given time.59
Again, in Unended Quest, Popper tells us that it is rational to act on
the basis of a well-corroborated theory. But-since he insists that
the fact that a theory is corroborated, to however high a degree, is
absolutely no reason to believe that it is it true, that it is probable, or
that it is reliable - the only rationale he can offer is that "actions ...
are 'rational' . . . if they are carried out in accordance with the state.
. . of the critical scientific discussion." This may sound somewhat
reassuring, but the next sentence reveals that, by Popper's lights, it
is a trivial verbal truth: "[tihere is no better synonym for 'rational'
than 'critical."' So, after all, Popper has given no substantive rea-
son for thinking that it is more rational to act on the basis of well-
tested theories than on the purely speculative.
And, as we saw, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper uses
words like "knowledge" and "discovery" without their usual con-
notation of truth,61 and (though less openly) "falsified" without its
usual connotation of "falsehood." 62 He also tells us that what he
' POPPER, Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 215
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS, supra note 5.
5 POPPER, Two Faces of Common Sense, in OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 36, at
103. As Popper defines it, the "verisimilitude" of a theory is the proportion of its
truth-content to its falsity-content; so his gloss "nearness to the truth" seems to be
somewhat misleading.
60 POPPER, supra note 18, at 87; see also POPPER, Conjectural Knowledge, in OBjECVE
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 36, at 22 (acknowledging that "choosing the best-tested the-
ory as the basis of action ... is not 'rational' in the sense that it is based upon good
reasons for expecting that it will in practice be a successful choice: there can be no good
reasons in this sense").
61 See DAVID STOVE, POPPER AND AFTER: FOUR MODERN IRRATIONALISTS (1982) (re-
printed under the title ANYTHING GOES: ORIGINS OF THE CULT OF SCIENTIFIC
IRRATIONALISM (1999)) (criticizing Popper's penchant for "neutralising success-
words"). Stove does not, however, note that Popper also neutralizes failure-words
like "falsified."
62 Later, Popper tells us that the "objective knowledge" to which he refers consists
of "theories published in journals and books ... ; discussions of such theories; diffi-
culties or problems ... with such theories," and even "the logical content of our ge-
netic code"; and that it belongs not to "world 1" (the realm of physical objects) or
"world 2" (the realm of mental states), but to "world 3" (the realm of abstract objects
such as numbers). POPPER, supra note 59, at 73.
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calls "objective scientific knowledge" is all "conjectural,"6 meaning
that none of it is believed, any or all of it may turn out to be false,
and none of it is ever warranted by good evidence-in fact, it is
nothing but "a woven web of guesses."M Again, his repeated refer-
ences to "objective scientific knowledge" may sound reassuring, but
the fact is that none of this does anything to alleviate the covert
skepticism.
And, most consequentially for present purposes, before Popper
realized how misleading this was, and adopted the word "corrobo-
ration" instead, he went along with Rudolf Carnap's translation of
his word "Bewihrung" as "confirmation," 65 and for a while even
used the word "confirmation" himself. But in a footnote added to
the English translation of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he writes:
Carnap translated my term 'degree of corroboration' . . . as
'degree of confirmation'. ... I fell in with his usage, think-
ing that words do not matter.... I myself used the term
'confirmation' for a time ....
Yet it turned out that I was mistaken: the association of the
word 'confirmation' did matter . .. '[degree of confirma-
tion' was soon used ... as a synonym . .. of 'probability'. I
have therefore now abandoned it . . . .66
6 See, e.g., id. at 1-31.
64 KARL R. POPPER, Lecture at the University of Tibingen: Toleration and Intellec-
tual Responsibility (May 26, 1981), in POPPER, IN SEARCH OF A BETTER WORLD 188
(1992) (The phrase comes from Xenophanes, but Popper is here using it on his own
behalf.). Popper adds: "scientific knowledge . . . consists of . .. conjectures only....
The content of these . . . conjectures may be called knowledge in the objective sense." Id.
at 197-98.
6 It is not entirely clear that Carnap's was a mistranslation of the German word
Popper had used. See COLLINS GERMAN UNABRIDGED DICIONARY (5th ed. 2004),
available at http:/dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/Bew%C3%A4hrung (explaining
"Bewahrung" as "proving oneself or one's worth," "proving itself or its worth," and
giving as a secondary meaning "probation"). It is clear, however, that given the state
of play in philosophy of science at the time, the effect of translating "Bewdhrung" as
"confirmed" was extremely misleading.
66 POPPER, supra note 7, at 251-52 n.*1.
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Small wonder, then, that-though Popper's official story, the
Big Idea, is about as ill-suited as it could be to discriminate reliable
from unreliable scientific testimony-the parts where he takes it
back make it all too easy to misconstrue what the Popperian story
really is. So it should come as no surprise to find that the idea that
Popper's philosophy of science will be helpful to courts needing to
determine whether scientific testimony is reliable enough to be ad-
mitted turns out to rest on mistakenly taking him to hold - what he
repeatedly and emphatically denied -that a claim that has been tested
but not falsified is thereby confirmed, i.e., shown to be probable, warranted,
valid, or reliable.67
III. How DID DAUBERT GET POPPER So WRONG?
Popper's ideas entered judicial thinking on the admissibility of
expert testimony, as we saw earlier, with Justice Blackmun's obser-
vations about how federal courts might go about determining
whether such testimony is reliable enough to be admitted. Since
Rule 702 refers to "scientific . . . knowledge," Justice Blackmun ar-
gued, courts must determine whether proffered scientific evidence
really is scientific knowledge. 68 "[TJhe word 'knowledge' connotes
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation," he ex-
plained, citing Webster's dictionary; and "[t]he adjective 'scientific'
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science."69
But what is the mark of genuine science, and what are the
methods and procedures followed in genuinely scientific work? The
unmistakably Popperian flavor of Justice Blackmun's answer is
clear from the first consideration on his "flexible list" of indicia of
reliability:
[A] key question . .. in determining whether a theory or
technique is scientific knowledge ... [is] whether it can be
67 It is worth noting that, in his testimony in McLean, Michel Ruse misinterpreted
Popper in just this way. Ruse, supra note 1, at 303 (claiming that according to Popper,
"if ... tests are positive then the theory is confirmed, at least in the circumstances of
that test. And, as a theory is confirmed in more and more circumstances, it is given
increasing weight by science").
6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see also id. at 588
(citing FED. R. EvID. 702)
69Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
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(and has been) tested. "Scientific methodology today is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if
they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what dis-
tinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."70
The internal quotation here is from a law review article by Mi-
chael Green;71 but in the next sentence Justice Blackmun cites Pop-
per himself: "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."72
Unfortunately, the article of Popper's from which this quotation
is taken, first published in 1957, is one of the places where he used
Carnap's word, "confirmation" -which, only two years later, he
would abandon as misleading. Perhaps this begins to explain why,
in the very same sentence, Justice Blackmun also quotes another phi-
losopher of science, Carl Hempel: "the statements constituting a
scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test."73 Appar-
ently Justice Blackmun was quite unaware that Popper's under-
standing of "testable" ("potentially falsifiable") and Hempel's ("po-
tentially confirmable or falsifiable") are quite different; that Popper
specifically identifies Hempel as a proponent of the inductivist phi-
losophy of science he repudiates;74 and that by 1959, Popper had
realized the danger of confusing his negativist, deductivist concept
of corroboration with the positivist, inductivist idea of confirma-
tion. And neither, obviously, does Justice Blackmun realize that
Popper expressly disavows any interest in the reliability of scientific
70 Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
7 Michael D. Green, Legal Theory: Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.
U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992).
72 Id. The citation is to CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS, POPPER, supra note 5, at 37.
Justice Blackmun cites the 5th ed. (1989). But this book, which was first published in
1963, is an anthology of previously-published papers; and the article Justice Black-
mun cites, Science: Conjectures and Refutations, was first published under the title Phi-
losophy of Science: A Personal Report, in BRITISH PHILOSOPHY IN MID-CENTURY (C.A.
Mace ed., 1957). Unfortunately, when this paper was reprinted in CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS, Popper did not note the misunderstanding over "confirmed" and
"corroborated." Notice also that in this article Popper writes of falsifiability as "the,"
not "a," criterion of demarcation.
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL
SCIENCE 49 (1966)).
74 POPPER, supra note 36, at 20 n.29.
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theories, and indeed avoids even using the word "reliable" without
precautionary scare quotes.
It looks as if-perhaps unduly influenced by that honorific use
of "science," "scientific," etc., as generic terms of epistemological
praise, and perhaps forgetting that not all scientific expert testi-
mony is reliable, nor all reliable expert testimony scientific75 -
Justice Blackmun ran "reliable" and "scientific" together. Then,
casting about for some criterion to distinguish the genuinely scien-
tific from pretenders, he fastened on Popper's criterion of falsifiabil-
ity but-not realizing that this was part of a thoroughly negative
philosophical package that is no help at all on the question of reli-
ability-ran Popper's and Hempel's quite different understandings
of "testable" together.76
But Daubert's pseudo-Popper was probably not entirely Justice
Blackmun's own creation, for the same misinterpretation of Popper
was to be found in several amicus briefs filed in the case, as well as in
the law review article cited in the relevant part of the ruling. Three of
the four "Daubert factors" were already prefigured in an amicus brief
submitted by the U.S. Department of Justice: arguing that expert tes-
timony must reach a certain level of reliability if it is to be, as Rule 702
required, helpful to the trier of fact, these amici suggested error rates,
peer review, and acceptance in the field as indicia of reliability." And
the first, quasi-Popperian Daubert factor, though not found in this
amicus brief, is prefigured in several of the others.78
7 FED R. EvID. 702 speaks of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"
(emphasis added); so the ellipses in Justice Blackmun's reference to "scientific ...
knowledge" are significant.
76 It may also be relevant that the usual meaning of "corroborated" in legal con-
texts is something like "confirmed by other witnesses." See, e.g., 81 AM. JUR. 2D Wit-
nesses § 968 (2009).
7 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL 13006291 at *11-
*12. However, these amici suggest that acceptance by at least a significant minority in
the field would suffice, whereas Daubert says that "[w]idespread acceptance can be
an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible...." Daubert, 509 U.S. at
594.
Is See Brief for the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 609 U.S. 579
(1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL 13006281; Brief of the American Medical Ass'n et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102), 1993
WL 13006385; Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology & Govern-
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For example, an amicus brief submitted by the American Medi-
cal Association, et al., which avers that "a]n opinion is only based
upon scientific knowledge if it is developed in accordance with the
scientific method," goes on to say - citing Popper - that "[i]f a hy-
pothesis is repeatedly corroborated by empirical testing, it is ...
generally accepted as valid." In principle, these amici admit, "no scien-
tific theory is ever definitively confirmed"; however, they continue,
"[a]s a practical matter . . . , some theories are so thoroughly tested
that they become virtually incontrovertible."79 Given how close being
incontrovertible is to being unfalsifiable, this is about as un-
Popperian as it could be.
Another amicus brief, from the Product Liability Advisory
Council, et al., describes the scientific method like this:
(1) first set forth a hypothesis, (2) design an experiment ...
or experiments, to test the hypothesis, (3) conduct the ex-
periment, collect the data, and then analyze those data, (4)
publish the results so that they may ... be subject to exter-
nal scrutiny, and (5) ensure that those results are replicable
and verifiable.
Each of these clauses has its own citation (omitted here); the last-
appended to the part about the results being "replicable and verifi-
able" - is to The Logic of Scientific Discovery.a0 Given Popper's repu-
diation of verificationism and his conventionalism about basic
statements, this too is an exegetical travesty.
An amicus brief from the Carnegie Commission on Science,
Technology, and Government argues that "opinions based on claims
that are not capable of being tested should not be admitted into evi-
dence" and cites Popper.81 It immediately adds, citing a report from a
ment as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-
102), 1992 WL 12006530; Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102), 1993 WL
13006388.
79 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, supra note 78, at *11 (emphasis added).
s0 Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council, supra note 78, at *23, n.20 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
81 Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology & Government, supra
note 78, at *13 and *14, n. 12.
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Panel of the National Academy of Sciences, 82 that results that cannot
be replicated should also be excluded and that "scientists have the
responsibility to replicate and reconfirm their results."83 Fair enough,
except that the failure of these amici to note that Popper expressly
eschews the notion of confirmation conveys the false impression that
claims that have been subjected to repeated tests but not falsified
have been "reconfirmed." But of course results can't be reconfirmed
unless they have first been confirmed.
And an amicus brief from the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, et al., though it doesn't mention Popper
by name, makes free use of his term "corroborated," and comments
that: "[S]cience ... proceed[s] through a series of interrelated steps
centered on the generation and testing of hypotheses. Hypotheses
are educated guesses about a particular phenomenon or event ....
[S]cientists conduct rigorous experimental testing in order to falsify
hypotheses."M This all sounds entirely Popperian -until the next
sentence: "An hypothesis is accepted as generally valid to the extent
that it has survived repeated attempts at falsification."85 This, of course,
is the by now familiar pseudo-Popperian line.86
The crucial misreading of Popper was also, apparently, circulat-
ing in the law reviews, and is found specifically in the article by
Michael Green87 that Justice Blackmun quotes in Daubert. The key
passage of Green's paper-a very small part of a long article, most
82 1 PANEL ON SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH, NATL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE: INSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
RESEARCH PROCESS (1992).
8 Brief of the Carnegie Commission, supra note 78, at *14 n.13 (emphasis added).
The passage from the NAS report concludes by speaking of "an ongoing process of
revision and refinement that corrects errors and strengthens the fabric of research." 1
PANEL ON SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH, supra note 82.
84 Brief for the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, supra note 78, at
*8-*9.
8 Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
86 In a paper published the same year, one of the signatories, Bert Black, had pub-
lished an article (written jointly with Francisco Ayala) which calls explicitly on Pop-
per-and perpetrates the same misunderstanding. Francisco J. Ayala & Bert Black,
Science and the Courts, 81 AM. SCIENTIST 230, 237 (1993) (citing Popper for the argu-
ment that "[blecause scientific hypotheses can be falsified but not absolutely estab-
lished, they can only be accepted contingently," and then giving "[an example of
how a critical test can crystallize understanding and certainty") (emphasis added).
87 Green, supra note 71.
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of which is taken up with a complex discussion of issues about epi-
demiological evidence in toxic-tort litigation -reads as follows:
Hume criticized the inductive, rather than the deductive,
methodology. From that criticism emerged the idea that
while induction could never conclusively prove a proposi-
tion, it could falsify one. Thus, based on the framework
provided by Karl Popper, knowledge is gained by attempt-
ing to falsify a hypothesis based on empirical investiga-
tion. Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified;
indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science
from other fields of human inquiry. Of course, if a hypothe-
sis repeatedly withstands falsification, we may tend to accept it,
even if conditionally, as true.88
Setting aside the first sentence, and skating over the second (where,
I suspect, Green said "induction" when he meant to say "deduc-
tion"), I turn to the sentence Justice Blackmun quotes, the one be-
ginning "Scientific methodology today .... "
This sentence vaguely suggests that Popper's ideas were by
then the consensus position in contemporary philosophy of science,
or among scientists themselves-or perhaps, even, that working
scientists en masse had by then come to recognize the virtues of the
methodology Popper recommended. This suggestion is misleading,
to say the least. As I said earlier,89 at one time Popper's ideas were
not only very influential among philosophers of science, but also
endorsed by a number of distinguished scientists, among them Sir
Herman Bondi, Sir Peter Medawar, and Sir John Eccles - the "Pop-
perian knights."9 0 And as I also said, there are still enthusiastic
8 Id. at 645-46 (emphasis added).
89 See supra p. 396.
90 suspect that what scientists found attractive about Popper's ideas may have
been his picture of the scientist as making bold conjectures and fearlessly testing
them and his stress on the rational, critical character of science and the objectivity of
scientific knowledge. But John Eccles, who seems to have had the clearest under-
standing of the views he was endorsing, makes it very plain that their real appeal, for
him, was the idea that it was not shameful, but a good thing, if your hypothesis was
refuted -which, he reports, helped him out of a severe depression. John C. Eccles,
The World of Objective Knowledge, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER, supra, note
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Popperians about. But Popper's philosophy of science was never
"generally accepted in the field to which it belongs;" 91 and by the
time of Green's article, only a relatively few Popperian philosophers
of science remained. It is the last clause of the last sentence of this
passage, however, that is most to the present purpose: "if a hy-
pothesis repeatedly withstands falsification, we may tend to accept
it, even if conditionally, as true." This is a real rhetorical hum-
dinger, managing to suggest, without ever actually saying, that a
claim that has been tested but not falsified is thereby shown to be
("conditionally") true -a completely un-Popperian suggestion.
In a footnote to the passage I quoted, Green cites The Logic of
Scientific Discovery- the whole thing, giving no page numbers; and
in the same footnote, he cites a law review article by David Faig-
man, published shortly before his own. It seems possible that
Green hadn't actually read Popper, but was relying on Faigman's
account.92 If So, it was not an entirely happy choice of source. Here
is Faigman on Popper's philosophy of science:
51, at 350. Peter Medawar writes that "[slcientific methodology has to do with ...
validation and justification," and though later in the same paper he sounds somewhat
more Popperian, he adds that the critical part of scientific reasoning aims to find out
whether scientists' imaginative stories "are stories about real life." Peter Medawar,
Science and Literature, ENCOUNTER, Jan. 1969, 15, at 17, 20 (emphasis added). And I
can testify from personal experience that Hermann Bondi did not fully understand
what he was endorsing. In the course of a 1998 lecture at the University of Miami,
which he opened by explaining that he was a strong Popperian, Bondi told us that
cosmology became a science in 1826, when Wilhelm Olbers made the first falsifiable
cosmological conjecture; and that this conjecture was in due course falsified, and a
new conjecture devised -a new conjecture which, he continued, was by now "well-
confirmed by observation." Hermann Bondi, Lecture in the Dep't of Physics at Univ.
of Miami (1998).
9" D.H. Mellor's critical notice of the two large volumes of THE PHILOSOPHY OF
KARL POPPER conveys something of the state of play by that point. He writes, for
example, "Take Popper's attitude to induction, a central point of Popperian method
and mythology. Popperians find us obtuse who do not see that Popper has solved
the problem of induction. The feeling is mutual. . . . [A.J.] Ayer here repeats some
long-standing objections to Popper's solution, of which Popper again fails to see the
force." D.H. Mellor, The Popper Phenomenon, 52 PHIL. 195, 196 (1977).
9 In July 2009, I asked Professor Green whether, when he wrote this paper, he had
read Popper or had relied on Faigman's article; he replied that it was too long ago to
remember. E-mail from author to Michael D. Green (Jul. 8, 2009) (on file with au-
thor); Email from Michael D. Green to author (Jul.10, 2009) (on file with author).
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Falsifiability or testability represents the line of demarca-
tion between science and pseudo-science, and the strength
of particular scientific statements depends on the extent to which
they have been tested appropriately.... Popper devoted much
of his philosophical efforts to articulating a criterion by
which scientific statements could be distinguished from
nonscientific statements, especially pseudo-scientific, pre-
scientific, and metaphysical statements. . . . Empirical re-
search might corroborate [a] hypothesis by finding evidence sup-
porting it . ..93
Faigman apparently did read (some) Popper, but didn't under-
stand him very well. For one thing, the word "strength" in his first
sentence is a fudge.94 For another, there is slippage between this
first sentence, which talks about science versus pseudo-science, and
the next, which also includes pre-science, etc., under non-science;
but there is no indication that Faigman realizes that the fact that
Popper's criterion is intended to do several different jobs itself pre-
sents problems. But most importantly, the last sentence here, ac-
cording to which corroboration is a matter of finding supportive
evidence, encapsulates the key misunderstanding of Popper -the
misunderstanding that will be passed down, via Professor Green, to
Justice Blackmun.
IV. FALSIFIABILITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Only two of Justice Blackmun's colleagues on the Daubert
Court - then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens, who
joined in Justice Rehnquist's partial dissent 95 - seem to have been
even half-aware of how muddled the philosophy of science built
into the majority ruling was. Yes, Justice Rehnquist wrote, Frye had
been superseded; and yes, nevertheless, courts' responsibility for
9 David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to Law
as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1015-18 (1989) (emphasis added).
9 Popper would indeed say that the strength of a claim depends on its content, i.e.,
that more falsifiable hypotheses are "stronger," in one sense. But Faigman's words
vaguely suggest, without actually saying, that well-tested hypotheses are "strong" in
the sense of "well-confirmed."
9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting in part).
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screening expert testimony remained. 96 But, he continued, there was
no explicit reference in Rule 702 to reliability, and Justice Black-
mun's observations about "scientific . . . knowledge" were too
vague and too general to be helpful. 97 These observations, he ar-
gued, were bound to raise difficulties down the road, when courts
have to determine how to handle non-scientific expert testimony;98
and, frankly, he was baffled-as well he might be-by Justice
Blackmun's allusions to falsifiability: "I defer to no one in my confi-
dence in federal judges, but I am at a loss to know what is meant
when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its
'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them will be, too." 99
Subsequent rulings in which federal judges refer to Popper, falsifi-
ability, or testability suggest that Justice Rehnquist was right to suspect
that they would be confused. Sometimes, after quoting the passage in
Daubert presenting the Court's "flexible list" of indicia of reliability,
courts quietly set the Popperian rhetoric aside 00 and focus instead on
some other aspect of the proffered testimony. But some courts take the
first, Popperian Daubert factor to be primary;101 and when courts actu-
ally try to use this factor, the results generally have been quite strange.
9Id.
7Id. at 600.
98 Indeed there were difficulties -resolved in 1999, when the Supreme Court ruled
that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, not only the scientific. Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600.
10o See, e.g., Savage v. Union Pac. R.R., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (citing
the four Daubert factors, but relying primarily on the fact that the plaintiff did not
prove his level of exposure to creosote); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk
Producers, 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (citing the four Daubert factors,
but relying on Bernard D. Goldtsein & Mary Sue Heniflin, Reference Guide on Toxicol-
ogy, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 181 (1st ed.
1994)).
101 Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The first and most signifi-
cant Daubert factor is whether the scientific theory has been subjected to the scien-
tific method."); Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 345 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (arguing that, since Daubert, "[an issue of primary importance in the determi-
nation of whether a theory or technique is 'scientific knowledge' that will assist the
trier of fact is 'whether it can be (and has been) tested"') (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593); see also Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing
Bradley, 42 F.3d at 438; Chikovsky, 832 F. Supp. at 345) (arguing that testimony having
been arrived at by the scientific method is "the most significant of the Daubert fac-
tors").
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A particularly egregious example - almost amusing, if what
was at stake were not so serious-is United States v. Bonds, which
came down very shortly after Daubert. Faced with a defense chal-
lenge to the FBI laboratory's DNA analyses, the court read its new
gatekeeping obligations strictly au pied de la lettre. The defendants
proffered evidence that DNA identifications conducted by the FBI
laboratory had been found to be unreliable, but the court reasoned
that nonetheless the FBI identifications were admissible under
Daubert; arguing that, in proffering evidence about the deficiencies
of the FBI lab, "the defendants have conceded that the theory and
methods can be tested. The dispute . . . is over how the results have
been tested, not over whether the results can be or have been
tested." 102 In other words, the fact that the FBI lab's DNA work had
been tested and shown to be unreliable showed that the FBI's testi-
mony could be and had been tested; and hence was grounds for
admitting it - as reliable!
Sometimes courts engage in a little light philosophy of science
on their own behalf. In United States v. Hines, the court relates in a
footnote that the Daubert ruling had been accused of "simply
tak[ing] the definition of science from Karl Popper, a definition that
others have criticized as deriving from a culturally defined, time-bound
paradigm."103 Perhaps this vaguely Kuhnian talk signals that Green's
reference to "scientific methodology today" had not gone unno-
ticed. Also worthy of note is Bitler v. A. 0. Smith Corp. where-
instead of alluding, like Justice Blackmun, to the incongruous phi-
losophical firm of Popper, Hempel & Associates -the court actually
distinguishes the falsificationist Popper from the verificationist
Hempel; 104 but unfortunately it fails to note that Popper's and
Hempel's views are incompatible.
102 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993).
103 United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65 n.7 (D. Mass. 1999) (emphasis
added) (citing, inter alia, Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the Questfor Value-
Free "Scientific Knowledge" in the Courtroom, 30 U. RIcH. L. REv. 85 (1996)). The court
does not note, however, that Professor Capron had quoted a passage in which Pop-
per expressly repudiates any interest in whether a theory is true or acceptable. Id. at
92 n.23 (citing Popper, supra note 5, at 33). Capron's is, in fact, the only law review
article I have found that gets Popper right on this.
IN 400 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2004) (referring to the Supreme Court's citation to
"Popper's method of falsification" and (a few lines later) to "the logical positivist
Carl Hempel").
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Legally more significant, probably, are two fingerprint cases
that misinterpret Daubert's reference to "testability" as referring not
to scientific, empirical testing, but to legal, dialectical testing in
court. In United States v. Havvard, the court reasons that "[the] claim
of uniqueness and permanence [of fingerprints] is a scientific claim
in the sense that it can be falsified. . . . In the roughly 100 years since
fingerprints have been used for identification purposes, no one has
managed to falsify the claim of uniqueness . . . ."1os Of course, the
crucial issue is not really whether fingerprints are unique, but
whether accurate identifications can be made on the basis of latent
prints representing, on average, 20% of a full fingerprint; but set
that aside. The most interesting point for present purposes is the
way the court goes on to construe "testing": in terms, not of empiri-
cal testing in a laboratory or in the field, but of in-court "testing"
through cross-examination: "[T]he methods of latent print identifi-
cation can be and have been tested. They have been tested for
roughly 100 years. They have been tested in adversarial proceed-
ings with the highest possible stakes-liberty and sometimes
life."106 Whatever, exactly, Popper understood by testing, we can be
quite sure it was not argument and counter-argument in adversarial
legal proceedings. 07
And in United States v. Mitchell, ruling that the lower court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting latent-fingerprint identification
testimony, the court first looks to Webster's dictionary for a definition
of "falsifiable": "capable of being proved false, defeasible"; then
glosses this in a way that starts out sounding entirely Popperian: "for
105 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 852 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
1o6 Id. at 854.
10 Nor, I believe-recalling his angry dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle-was it what Jus-
tice Blackmun had in mind. 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
White, writing for the majority, had argued that psychiatrists' predictions that the
defendant would be dangerous in the future had correctly been admitted, despite the
fact that an amicus brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association acknowl-
edged that such predictions were wrong two times out of three. Reliability, he rea-
soned, was a matter to be determined through cross-examination and the presenta-
tion of contrary witnesses. Id. at 898-99 (majority opinion). Justice Blackmun, how-
ever, argued that in this case the adversarial process had failed to expose unreliable
testimony. Id. at 929-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("There is every reason to believe
that ... jurors will be still less capable [than judges] of 'separating the wheat from the
chaff,' despite the Court's blithe assumption to the contrary.").
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instance, the hypothesis 'all crows are black' is falsifiable (because an
albino crow could be found tomorrow)";'" but then wanders into
more comfortable legal territory: "a clairvoyant's statement that he
receives messages from dead relatives is not [falsifiable] (because
there is no way for the departed to deny this)."10 Then, after conflating
"falsify" and "deny," the court argues that:
In this case the relevant premises were posed as explicit
questions to many of the government experts: (1) Are hu-
man friction ridge arrangements unique and permanent?
And (2) Can a positive identification be made from finger-
prints containing sufficient quantity and quality of detail?
The government's experts responded in the affirmative.1"0
But then, apparently realizing that relying on the FBI's experts' ipse
dixit won't quite do, the court reverts to the same strictly-literal in-
terpretation of the first Daubert factor we encountered in Bonds: "We
must consider not whether we agree as a factual matter . . . but
rather whether these hypotheses are testable (or tested). We con-
clude that they are.""'
However, by far the commonest pattern is for courts using the
first Daubert factor simply to take for granted that theories that have
withstood testing without being falsified are thereby shown to be
reliable. In Bradley v. Brown, Judge Moody observes that "the court
must weed out the speculative hypothesis from the tested the-
ory";112 evidently he is unaware that, according to Popper, all scien-
tific theories are speculative hypotheses. Similarly, in United States
v. Starzecpyzel- after holding a Daubert hearing on forensic docu-
ment identification testimony at the end of which it ruled that such
testimony is not scientific, and hence falls outside the scope of
Daubert- the court explained that "[t]he Daubert test is grounded in
the scientific process and directs the judge to evaluate the quality of
1o 365 F.3d 215, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
1' Id. (emphasis added).
110 Id. (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 235-36.
112 852 F. Supp. 690, 700 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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the testing supporting the scientific conclusion."13 We see the same as-
sumption in Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., where the court excluded plain-
tiff's expert Dr. Mash on the grounds that he offered nothing but "a
hypothesis which he had yet to attempt to verify or disprove by sub-
jecting it to ... testing;""4 and in In Re TMI Litigation, where Judge
Rambo excluded Dr. Gunckel's testimony on the grounds that,
though he had "advanced a hypothesis capable of falsification," he
had made "no effort . . . to verify either methodology or the conclusions
reached."115 We see it again in Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., where
the court relies on that fatal sentence from Michael Green's article,
that while "[t]heoretically . . . hypotheses are not affirmatively
proved, only falsified, . . . of course, if a hypothesis repeatedly with-
stands falsification, one may tend to accept it ... [as] true." u6
And we see it again in Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., where
the court reasons that "the scientific method must be an objective
one. This is the essence of what the Supreme Court referred to as
scientific validity, also known as 'falsifiability."' 117 Here the court
equates scientific validity (which Daubert had identified with evi-
dentiary reliability, and defined in a footnote as the testimony's be-
ing trustworthy, i.e., showing what it purports to show)ns with fal-
sifiability (which, however, is entirely consistent with the testi-
mony's being plain false). The same year, in Rogers v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the court reasons that "[flor scientists, a
new idea or explanation is not valid unless there is a possibility that
empirical testing can prove it false and until it has withstood thoughtful
efforts at falsification.""9
113 United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemo-
logical Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testi-
mony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2294 (1994)) (emphasis added).
114 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
115 In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 911 F. Supp. 775, 805 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (emphasis
added).
116 126 F.3d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Green, supra note 71, at 643,64546).
117 126 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1127 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (emphasis added).
11 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).
119 Rogers v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., No. 94-0089, 1999 WL 809824, at
*12 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 17, 1999) (emphasis added) [The court quotes Bert Black, Francisco
J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search
for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L.R. 751, 756 (1994) (but it incorrectly references the
TEX. L.J.)]. Black et al. write that "[tiesting either establishes or fails to establish false-
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In Tobin v. Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceuticals, the court denied
the defendant's motion to exclude plaintiff's expert testimony, hold-
ing that this testimony had been "tested to an extent sufficient to dem-
onstrate ... reliability . . . ."120 The same year, in Cloud v. Pfizer, the
court excluded plaintiffs expert Dr. Johnstone, arguing that, while
the proposition that Zoloft causes suicide is testable, the fact that he
"[could] not point to one scientific study that supports his conclusion"
showed that his testimony is unreliable.121 Then there's the gloss on
the first Daubert factor given in Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals:
"The hallmark of [Daubert's] reliability prong is the scientific
method, i.e., the generation of testable hypotheses that are then sub-
jected to the real-world crucible of experimentation, falsifica-
tion/validation, and replication."122 This passage, and especially that
fused phrase "falsification/validation," encapsulates the crucial
misunderstanding in a nutshell; it is cited verbatim in several sub-
sequent cases.123
In one of those cases, Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, the court
first runs through the epidemiological evidence presented: the "ERI
study" (where the relative risk was "not statistically significant");124
the "Witlin-Sibai study" (which showed a decreased risk of postpar-
tum stroke in women taking the drug);125 the "HCI study" (where
hood; it never establishes absolute truth." Id. at 762 (emphasis added). Their word
"absolute" hints that corroboration might establish provisional truth; and indeed,
they continue, "[blecause the truth of scientific hypotheses can never be established
conclusively, they can only be accepted contingently," and "scientists do not have
the same degree of confidence in all hypotheses that have survived falsification." Id.
120 Estate of Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Wyo.
2001).
121 Cloud v. Pfizer, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1135 (D. Ariz. 2001) (emphasis
added).
' Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (em-
phasis added).
12 See Krutsinger v. Pharmacia Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30766, at *10 (S.D. Ill.
May 20, 2004) (using precisely these words from Caraker, but citing to Daubert); Bickel
v. Pfizer, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922 (N.D. Ind., 2006); Hardiman v. Davida, Inc.,
No. 2:05-CV-262-JM., 2007 WL 1395568, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 10, 2007); Bauer v. Bayer
A.G., 564 F. Supp. 2d 365, 380 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 452,459 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
124 Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434,455 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
125 Id. at 455-56.
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there were "huge amounts of uncertainty in the data");126 the "Kitt-
ner study" (where there was "no evidence whatsoever" in support
of the plaintiffs claim);127 and the "Herings and Stricker study"
(which "does not support" the plaintiffs hypothesis).128 Then, to
conform to the language of Daubert, the court puts all this in terms
of the plaintiff's failure to falsify the null hypothesis -here, the hy-
pothesis that any difference, in the sample studied, between the rate
of postpartum stroke among women who take Parlodel and those
who do not is the result of chance -and reasons that:
To "falsify" a hypothesis in this context means to prove
that the "null hypothesis" - that Parlodel@ has no effect on
the risk of postpartum stroke -is false, i.e, that Parlodel@
in fact significantly increases the risk of postpartum stroke.
The failure of plaintiff's experts to show any study proving
that the null hypothesis has been falsified demonstrates
that their causal hypothesis has not been tested or verified by
the means of science.129
But as the phrase "tested or verified" suggests, what this really says
is that the plaintiffs experts have produced no statistically signifi-
cant evidence supporting the claim that Parlodel increases the risk
of postpartum stroke.
And - my personal favorite - in Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., sup-
posedly applying Daubert's Popperian clause, the court writes that
"Pugh did not conduct any scientific tests or experiments to bolster his
theory relating polyethylene delamination to gamma irradiation in
air, nor did he produce or rely on any studies to verify his conclu-
sions." 30
126 Id. at 456.
127 Id. at 457.
128 Id.
129 Id. (emphasis added).
I30 Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 421 F. 3d, 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added);
see also Robinson v. Garlock Equip. Co., 2009 WL 104197, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)
(denying motion to exclude expert testimony regarding an allegedly defective spigot
on the grounds that "Daubert does not require that the hypothesis be tested by its
proponent, only that it can be tested,"and that the fact that Dr. Quisnel "could have
bolstered his conclusions through conducting experiments" goes to weight rather than
424
Federal Philosophy of Science
Probably I should also mention the dog that didn't bark. Given
that it was quite clearly Popper's intent to rule out Freud's and
Adlers's psychoanalytical theorizing as not genuine science, not the
real thing, one might expect to find post-Daubert federal courts rou-
tinely excluding expert psychiatric testimony on the grounds that it
is untestable. But the only case I could find where the reasoning on
psychiatric testimony is strictly Popperian was United States v. Ca-
rucci.131 Excluding proffered expert testimony to the effect that the
same psychological problems that led to the defendant's compul-
sive gambling also led to his illegal securities trading, Judge Rakoff
reasoned that "the psychological construct proffered by the defense
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate even . . . calculated miscon-
duct." And in a footnote, citing Popper's Conjectures and Refutations,
he continued, "[plut differently, the construct suffers from being
unfalsifiable, and therefore unverifiable."132 The cited passage is exactly
on point; Judge Rakoff, it appears, had actually read Popper, or at
least the page of Popper that Justice Blackmun cites.
As in United States v. Hines, in Kokoralies v. Illinois Dept. of Correc-
tions, we encounter a little judicial foray into philosophy of science.
Ruling that there was no real basis for psychiatric evidence that the
appellant had borderline personality disorder, Judge Zagel notes that
Professor Allen disapproves of Daubert in part because he "prefers"
Kuhn's philosophy of science to Popper's; and comments that "[iff I
had to choose between Popper and Kuhn I would pick Popper de-
spite his flaws and so would nearly all scientists." But, he admits, the
point may not be of much practical consequence, since what is seen in
the courtroom is usually normal, not revolutionary, science.133
admissibility) (emphasis added). Note that what Daubert requires is that evidence
"can be (and has been) tested" (emphasis added), not "can be (or has been) tested."
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
13' 33 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
132 Id. at 303 n.3 (emphasis added) (citing POPPER, supra note 5, at 37) (arguing that,
because nothing could possibly falsify Freud's or Adler's theories, supposed "con-
firming" instances are really nothing of the kind). This observation is from the very
bottom of the page; the sentence Justice Blackmun had quoted in Daubert is near the
top of the same page.
133 Kokoralies v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 963 F. Supp. 1473, 1489 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(The same note tells us that Judge Zagel took a logic class with Dudley Shapere.).
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As in United States. v. Havvard, in Judge Garza's concurring
opinion in Flores v. Johnson, we find "testing" interpreted as refer-
ring to adversarial, rather than empirical, trials. Judge Garza argues
that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness flunk all the
Daubert factors; and, regarding the first factor, reasons that the ac-
curacy of such predictions has never really been tested-because
such predictions are not susceptible to "cross-examination and rebut-
tal."134
But most cases involving psychiatric testimony follow the now-
familiar pattern: courts take for granted that a theory's successfully
withstanding testing indicates that it is reliable. For example, in
Isely v. Capuchin Province, the court explains that:
[T]he witness should testify as to whether [his] theory can
be, or has been, tested or corroborated and, if so, by whom
and under what circumstances; whether the theory has been
proven out or not proven out under clinical tests or some
other accepted procedure for bearing it out . . . . [T]he wit-
ness must be able to show, through the use of reliable, vi-
able extrinsic evidence, whether repressed memory or
post-traumatic stress disorder is ... accepted in the field of
psychology . . . .135
The same year, Isely is cited in Shahzade v. Gregory, where the court
also finds recovered memory testimony admissible: "[though] re-
pressed memory, as is true with ordinary memories, 'cannot be
tested empirically,' and may not always be accurate, however, the
theory itself has been established to be valid . . . ."136
In United States v. Hall, the court finds that "testimony which is
simply not amenable to the scientific method should not be subject
to the strictures of Daubert" but treated as "specialized knowledge";
but qualifies this by noting that if testimony "posits an explanatory
theory to show a conclusion or determine causation ... this would
134 Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
135 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (emphasis added) (admitting expert
testimony on post-traumatic stress syndrome, with limitations).
136 Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Isely, 877 F.
Supp. at 1065) (second emphasis added) (ruling testimony on PTSD admissible).
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normally require experimental verification . . . ."137 And in Discepolo
v. Gorgone, denying a Daubert motion to exclude plaintiff's expert
Dr. Pratt from testifying that the plaintiff suffered from PTSD, argu-
ing that the psychiatric evaluation of alleged victims of child sexual
abuse is "an inexact science at best,"138 the court determined that
Dr. Pratt's diagnosis had been found to be "substantially accurate."139
The next year, in United States v. Thomas, both sides presented
evidence as to the level of risk that would be posed if the defendant
were released from pre-trial detention. The court found Supervisory
Special Agent Clemente's testimony for the prosecution inadmissi-
ble, on the grounds that he was "unable to demonstrate that his risk
assessment methodology had been (or could be) tested," 40 and ar-
gued that although, in this context, it is difficult to collect empirical
data, "this difficulty cannot, by itself, render a risk assessment
methodology reliable or exempt it from any sort of testing or valida-
tion."141 However, Dr. Blumberg's testimony for the defendant was
found admissible, on the grounds that "there is substantial support
from a variety of sources, based in part on empirical data" establish-
ing the reliability of his approach.142
"But," you may be thinking, "enough already! So federal judges
are not right on top of all the vagaries of twentieth-century philoso-
phy of science. It would be more remarkable, surely, if they were
fully conversant with the work of Popper, Hempel, at al." Indeed.
What is much more interesting, as I will argue in conclusion, is that
the conception of science we find implicit in many of these rulings,
albeit in an inarticulate and half-baked form, is more plausible than
the official Logical Negativist account.
137 United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1200-01 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (emphasis
added).
1 3 Discepolo v. Gorgone, 399 F. Supp. 2d 123,126 (D. Conn. 2005).
139 Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
140 United States v. Thomas, No. CRIM. CCB-03-0150., 2006 WL 140558, at *19 (D.
Md. Jan. 13, 2006).
141 Id. (emphasis added).
142 Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
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VI. THE STING IN THE TALE
To be sure, it is a mistake to conflate "scientific" and "reliable,"
as Justice Blackmun apparently did; and it is at least arguable that,
in requiring courts to assess the reliability of expert testimony,
Daubert fudged the legal line between questions of the admissibility
of evidence (a matter for courts to determine) and questions of its
weight (a matter for juries to decide). Moreover, other critics have
suggested numerous flaws in, and unintended consequences of, the
Daubert ruling.143 Nevertheless, all these issues aside, in any case
involving scientific testimony the question of reliability is bound to
arise, and must be determined somehow. But if Popper's account
were true, the legal system's interest in the question of the reliabil-
ity of scientific testimony would be completely misconceived.144
I don't believe that this concern is misconceived; and I don't be-
lieve you do, either.145 Think of Kerry Kotler, who was freed from
prison in 1993 after DNA analysis revealed that he was innocent of
the rape for which he had served eleven years of a twenty-five to
fifty-year sentence; and three years later was convicted of another
rape -of which DNA evidence showed he was guilty.146 If you be-
lieve, as I do, that there is such a thing as objectively more and less
reliable evidence, it will seem to you that in this instance justice was
(probably)147 well-served by science; but if you believe, as Popper
143 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL'Y, 65, 65 (2006) (argu-
ing that "Daubert ... is dubious, for many reasons").
'4 Indeed, if, as I have argued, Popper's account is really a kind of closet skepti-
cism, the legal system's interest in the reliability of testimony generally would be
misconceived. I can't pursue this more general issue here, but see HAACK, supra note
30, at 252, where I made the same point, in passing, with respect to Richard Rorty's
repudiation of epistemology.
145 Nor do I believe that even Popperians really believe we never have rational
grounds for our expectations. See Mellor, supra note 91, at 196 ( "Why will Popperi-
ans not admit to such beliefs, which they reveal every time they turn on the light or
use the telephone? As Carnap would say, none are so inductively blind as those who
pretend they cannot see. . . .").
146 See John T. McQuiston, Prosecutor Says DNA Evidence May Free Man, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1992, at B7; John T. McQuiston, Man Freed After a DNA Test is Sentenced in a
Second Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at 14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/24/nyregion/man-freed-after-a-dna-test-is-
sentenced-in-a-second-rape.html.
147 "Probably" because, without knowing a lot more than I do, I can't say with full
confidence that the DNA analyses in question were well-conducted, the chain of
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professes to, that there is no such thing as objectively supportive
evidence, you will be obliged to conclude that in this -and in every
legal case turning on scientific evidence - the hope that science
could contribute to justice is vain. This doesn't show that Popper is
wrong; but it does show how radical the consequences of Popper's
Logical Negativist epistemology would be for our - or any48 - legal
system. Nevertheless, I believe courts' misinterpretation of Popper
implicitly relies on inarticulate assumptions that are more plausible
than Popper's official story.
As we saw, the predominant pattern of federal rulings calling
on the first Daubert factor is that courts realize that they need to
know not only whether the basis of proffered expert testimony is
empirically testable, but more importantly whether it has actually
been tested, and if it has, how well it has performed on those tests;
and, if a theory has succeeded when tested, they take this to be
evidence, albeit less than absolutely conclusive evidence, that it is
evidence impeccable, etc. It appears that both cases were messy, to say the least. See
Peter J. Boyer, DNA on Trial, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2000), at 42.
14s In this context it is worth noting that Daubert (or something much like it) has
been adopted by thirty-one states (Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming) and by the Military Courts. CAMPBELL & LORANDOS,
supra note 6, n.6. According to a report published in 1999, only 3% of judges in
Daubert states understood the concept of falsification; some, reportedly, explained it
as "If there is white-out on the page, then the document has been falsified." STATE JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, A JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON THE BASIC PHILOSOPHIES AND METHODS OF
SCIENCE 31 (1999). Unfortunately, the authors of the Deskbook don't fully under-
stand Popper either; for they write that according to Popper, "predictions are ...
compared with observations to see whether the theory is supported." Id. at 28 (emphasis
added).
Daubert has also influenced other, non-U.S. jurisdictions. For example, in a 2007
ruling on compulsory DNA testing in paternity cases, the Supreme Court of Mexico
suggested indicia of the reliability of scientific testimony which (though the Court
didn't say this) are what we know as the Daubert factors: admissible scientific evi-
dence, the Court argues, must be both relevant and reliable ("fidedigna," "trustwor-
thy"); and it lists (among other indicia of reliability familiar from Daubert), that the
evidence should have been "sujeta a pruebas empiricas, o sea, que la misma haya
sido sujeto a pruebas de refutabilidad" ("subject to empirical testing, i.e., that it has
been subjected to tests of refutability"). 25 S.J.F. 111, 125 et seq. (Vol. 1, 9th Epoch,
Mar. 2007, Mex. Sup. Ct. First Chamber).
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reliable -as just about everybody, except for Popper and his most
loyal followers,149 would do. I agree.
It should by now be clear, however, that it is impossible just to
add, to Popper's official story, that a claim that has been tested but
not falsified is thereby shown to be to some degree reliable; for
this would transform Logical Negativism into an idea utterly dif-
ferent from what Popper proposed.o50 So it behooves me at least to
sketch what a reconstruction of the philosophy of science implicit
in courts' rulings might look like. This reconstructed account will,
of course, be thoroughly unlike hard-line Popperism (though it
will accommodate some elements from the shadow Popper): in
particular, it will be, not skeptical, but fallibilist; it will focus less
on demarcation than on continuities between scientific and other
kinds of empirical inquiry; and it will be, not purely logical, but
worldly-i.e., not confined exclusively to statements and their
logical relations, but also giving a role to the world and to scien-
tists' interactions with the world. In short, it will be much like the
Critical Common-sensist account I developed in Defending Sci-
ence -Within Reason.15'
The first thing to do is to get over the Popperian preoccupation with
demarcation:
149 And, ironically enough, the wildest of the irrationalists against whom Popper
set himself. See STOVE, supra note 61 (presenting Popper as the father of late twenti-
eth-century scientific irrationalism); Alan Olding, Popper for Afters, 19 QUADRANT 21
(1999) (arguing that a historicist brand of relativism was "already a bit more than
latent in Popper") ; Koertge, supra note 12 (suggesting that constructivist postmod-
ernists might find solace in Popper's philosophy of science). In the now-famous
words of Louis-S6bastien Mercier, "les extrames se touchent" ("extremes touch each
other"). LOUis-StBASTIEN MERCIER, TABLEAU DE PARIS (rev. ed. 1782). The phrase is
the title of chapter 48 of volume 4.
150 Nor would it be possible to rely instead on Hempel's inductivist philosophy of
science. For -though it is less grossly unsuitable for the Supreme Court's purposes
than Popper's account -even if Hempel's "logic of confirmation" were viable (which
he himself came to doubt late in life), it world be hopelessly inadequate to cope with
the enormously complex congeries of scientific evidence now routinely proffered in
toxic-tort and other cases. See Carl G. Hempel, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in
ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
(The Free Press 1965) (1945); CARL G. HEMPEL, The Irrelevance of the Concept of Truth
for the Critical Appraisal of Scientific Theories, in CARL G. HEMPEL: SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 75 (Richard Jeffreys ed., 2000) (1990).
151 SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE - WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND
CYNICISM (2003).
430
Federal Philosophy of Science
* Although (no doubt because of the remarkable successes of
the natural sciences) the words "science," "scientific," and
their cognates are often used as generic terms of epistemic
praise, this honorific usage is misleading: there is bad scien-
tific work as well as good. Moreover, rather than dismissing
bad scientific work with the generic accusation, "pseudo-
science," it is always better to say what, specifically, is
wrong with the work.
* That a purported explanation rules out some possible up-
shots is, not a sign that it is scientific in particular, but a
sign that it actually is explanatory.
* Willingness to take negative evidence seriously is a mark,
not of the scientist in particular, but of the honest inquirer
generally, be he a scientist, a historian, a legal or a literary
scholar, or whatever.
* The word "science" (or, better, the phrase "the sciences") is
best construed as referring to a loose federation of kinds of
inquiry into natural and social phenomena; and as distin-
guished from such other, legitimate kinds of inquiry as le-
gal or literary scholarship, history, metaphysics, mathemat-
ics, etc., by their subject-matter.
The next step is to re-think the whole idea of "Scientific Method,"
starting by distinguishing (1) the procedures followed by all serious
empirical inquirers, and (2) the specialized instruments, techniques,
etc., gradually developed by the various sciences.
* Any serious empirical inquirer will proceed by making an
educated conjecture as to the explanation of a puzzling
phenomenon or event, figuring out the consequences of the
conjecture's being true, checking how well those conse-
quences stand up to the evidence he has and any further
evidence he can obtain, and then using his judgment
whether to keep the conjecture, modify it, drop it and start
again, or wait for more evidence.
* Over time, the various sciences have gradually developed
instruments of observation, techniques of extraction, purifi-
cation, titration, etc., mathematical tools like the calculus,
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statistical techniques, computer programs, incentives to
honesty and evidence-sharing, . . . etc., etc., to amplify and
refine the ways of all serious empirical inquiry.
Obviously, the procedures of all serious empirical inquiry are not
used only by scientists, and the gradually evolving specialized sci-
entific tools, techniques, etc., often local to a specific field of science,
are not used by all scientists. So neither can be identified with "the
Scientific Method"; and yet, together, they begin to explain how the
sciences have been as successful as they have.
Next, we must set aside Popper's conventionalism about the empiri-
cal basis of science. What we need is an account that distinguishes
observations from statements reporting what is observed, but re-
places a sharp distinction of statements into the observational and
the theoretical by a continuum of the more and the less observa-
tional; and that recognizes that observation can give a scientist
grounds, albeit fallible grounds, for believing that (say) the needle
on the dial points to seven, or there is a black swan on the pond,
and so can contribute to the solidity of the evidence for a scientific
theory, i.e., to how warranted the theory is.
* It is in part scientists' observations that justify them in ac-
cepting claims like "Here is a glass of water"; even though,
because even so simple a statement as this carries some
theoretical baggage, only in part.
* Because all empirical inquiry ultimately depends on peo-
ple's sensory interactions with the world, the degree to
which a claim is warranted by the evidence possessed by a
person at a time is primary. The degree to which a claim is
warranted by the evidence shared by a group of people at a
time, and the degree to which a claim is warranted by the
evidence available at a time, must be understood as (legiti-
mate but) derivative.152
152 This contrasts, once again, with Popper's approach, which takes the impersonal
conception of warrant as primitive, and doesn't so much as acknowledge the legiti-
macy of the personal conception.
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So we will have to embark on the difficult task of getting a grip
on the complexities of evidence and the determinants of evidential quality.
* The evidence with respect to any serious scientific claim
ramifies in all directions, rather as the entries in a cross-
word puzzle do.
* How well evidence warrants a claim depends on how well
it supports it (supportiveness); how secure it is, independ-
ent of the claim in question (independent security); and
how much of the relevant evidence it includes (comprehen-
siveness).1ss
Because the determinants of evidential quality are multi-
dimensional, they will not necessarily yield a linear ordering; more-
over, if there is insufficient evidence either way, neither p nor not-p
may be warranted to any degree. So the next step is to distinguish
epistemic likelihoods from probabilities.
* The better the evidence is with respect to a theory, the like-
lier that it is true. But these are epistemic likelihoods, and
cannot be construed in terms of the mathematical calculus
of probabilities.
As this reveals, it is possible to repudiate probabilism without, as
Popper supposes, also rejecting the idea of supportive evidence or
well-warranted theory.
Next, we need an understanding of what makes evidence supportive
with respect to a claim.
* How well evidence supports a claim depends on how
tightly the two fit together to form an explanatory account.
153 See also Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of
Daubert, 4 J. OF BIOMEDICAL & HEALTH L. 253 (2008) (applying the analysis of evi-
dence sketched here, and spelled out in DEFENDING SCIENCE, supra note 151, to show
that some combinations of pieces of evidence, none of which would be sufficient by
itself to establish general causation to the required degree of proof, can do so jointly).
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Explanation is vocabulary-dependent, since a genuinely explana-
tory account requires general terms identifying real kinds of things;
so supportiveness is not a purely formal, logical relation, but de-
pends in part on the fit of scientific vocabulary to the world.
So the final step is to stop thinking of scientific rationality in purely
logical terms, and acknowledge that successful scientific inquiry, like
successful empirical inquiry of any kind, is a matter in part of our
interactions with the world, and so is possible only because we, and
the world, are a certain way.
* Our senses give us information about particular things and
events in the world, and these things and events are of
kinds, kinds the behavior of members of which falls into
patterns - the patterns of natural laws.
* And so it is possible, by making guesses as to the possible
explanation of puzzling phenomena or events, devising
ways to check them, and seeing how well they stand up to
evidence -even though there will be many more false starts
than successful guesses, and even though every step for-
ward will be fallible and imperfect - to make contributions
to the still only very partially-completed cathedral of scien-
tific knowledge.154
Unlike Popper's, this account acknowledges the legitimacy of
questions about the reliability of expert testimony. Moreover, it
enables us to distinguish "reliable" and "scientific," and to rec-
ognize that not all reliable expert testimony is scientific, nor all
scientific testimony reliable; and it suggests (precisely in line
154 Compare this, from the same paragraph in which Peirce anticipates Popper's
"swamp" analogy:
The translations of the cuneiform inscriptions . . . began in mere guesses, in
which their authors could have no real confidence. Yet by piling new conjec-
ture upon former conjectures apparently verified, this science has gone on to
produce under our very eyes a result so bound together by the agreement of
the readings with one another, with other history, and with known facts of
linguistics, that we are unwilling any longer to apply the word theory to it."
PEIRCE, supra note 52, at paragraph 589 (emphasis in original).
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with the Supreme Court's ruling in Kumho Tire)s55 that what mat-
ters legally should be whether expert testimony is reliable,
whether or not it is scientific. It reveals that any simple verbal
formula supposedly encapsulating "the Scientific Method" is
likely to be a distraction from the real complexities of evidence
and from the multiple, interconnected questions relevant in as-
sessing reliability. It tells us that the fact that a theory or tech-
nique has not been tested is a sign that investigation has not been
as thorough or as honest as it should have been; but also that the
fact that a theory or technique has performed successfully under
rigorous testing is an indication of its reliability. And it tells us
(also in line with Kumho Tire) that the kinds of test that are ap-
propriate will vary depending on the nature of the evidence in
question,156 and may-for example in the case of rival tests of
statistical significance, or of the conclusions to be drawn from a
DNA analysis-itself depend on other scientific knowledge. I
believe this conception of science is both philosophically more
plausible, and legally more helpful, 57 than the Popperian theory
on which post-Daubert courts ostensibly rely.
155 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (arguing that it is the word
"knowledge" in FED. R. EVID. 702, and not the word "scientific," that establishes the
standard of evidentiary reliability).
156 Id. at 150 (arguing that "we can neither rule in nor rule out, for all cases and for
all times, the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert . . . . Too much de-
pends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue").
157 My theoretical account will not, of course, provide a simple formula that judges
could apply to assess the worth of proffered scientific testimony; there can be no such
formula. There is no easy substitute for appraisal of the nitty-gritty details of the specific
scientific work concerned. See my discussion of "peer review and publication" in Peer
Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETsON L. REv. 789 (2007), and of "litiga-
tion-driven science" in What's Wrong With Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal
Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1053 (2008). My account does, however, as indi-
cated in note 153 above, suggest how best to think about, for example, the joint weight
of complex congeries of causation testimony.
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